This paper considers the policy changes that have led to the outsourcing of contracts for the delivery of public services in the UK, with a focus on the role of social economy organisations. Specifically, we critique the arguments in favour of social economy involvement in public service delivery, and suggest that increased reliance on the sector poses particular challenges with respect to community engagement and local accountability. We go on to argue that a relatively new form of community-based organisation -the Development Trust -is potentially well-positioned to address these challenges.
INTRODUCTION
The changing boundaries and functions of the welfare state in the UK, as well as changing social and political attitudes towards welfare provision, have been extensively debated across the social sciences (e.g. Amin et al., 2002; Levitas, 1998) . Since the 1980s, policy makers have argued that rising fiscal pressures, the increased costs of providing key public services and an ageing population mean that difficult choices about the core responsibilities and obligations of the state are inevitable. They have further argued that government has a responsibility to 'reform' and 'modernise' its activities in order to ensure that services address the requirements of users and are delivered 'efficiently'.
As a result public service delivery has become increasingly decentralised with provision delegated to multiple-agency concerns. This has facilitated private sector involvement in the domain of public welfare and led to the creation of new markets for public service provision which are underpinned by the logic of efficiency (Farnsworth, 2004) . In line with these policy changes and as part of its modernisation agenda, the UK government has increasingly looked to the social economy -voluntary and community organisations -to become involved in public service delivery. Because, it is argued, these organisations are rooted in their communities, they have the capacity to provide solutions to social issues that meet the needs of local people, and provide the additional benefit of building social cohesion and social capital (Amin et al., 1999; Williams, 2003) . These developments can be seen in the context of a broader 'Third Way' policy agenda (Giddens, 1998; , and fit neatly into the thinking that has been so influential within the New Labour government since 1997.
However, by embracing alternative and multiple public service providers the government has 'Social Economy Involvement in Public Service Delivery: Community Engagement and Accountability'. REGIONAL STUDIES, 43 (7), pp. 981-992. faced criticism for tacitly condoning uneven standards of welfare provision. Questions have also been raised about the extent to which social economy organisations are involved in genuine engagement with communities, as well as the extent to which their governance structures allow them to be accountable to local stakeholders. Indeed, it has been argued that public services 'on the cheap', rather than local innovation, constitutes the real motivation for the government's interest in the social economy.
In this paper, we critique the increasingly prominent role of social economy organisations in public service provision in the UK, and discuss the implications and challenges of this policy turn. In doing so we highlight a relatively new form of community-based organisation -the Development Trust -which we suggest may be well placed to deliver public services in a cost effective way, to implement the systems required to ensure accountability in the quality of service delivery, and to involve communities in local decision making.
PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY REFORM
The reform of public services in the UK has been marked over the last decades. This process of transformation has led to a current emphasis upon local accountability, local participatory democracy, and decentralised local government, representing a major shift in government policy, which has its roots in the Conservative government agenda of the 1980s. This was a period of de-centralising government, large-scale privatisation, and an overall contraction in the role of the State (Hula, 1993) , during which the Thatcher government introduced market mechanisms into public planning 1 . Therefore, it could be argued that the concerted shift towards localisation was a deliberate political project to weaken and undermine the power of 'Social Economy Involvement in Public Service Delivery: Community Engagement and Accountability'. REGIONAL STUDIES, 43 (7), pp. 981-992. local authorities. This strategy led directly to private involvement in large areas of local government, and the outsourcing of delivery to the private sector and social economy in key areas including road building and maintenance, refuse collection, leisure management, street cleaning, catering and park maintenance.
The introduction of Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) during the 1980s meant that local authorities had to submit competitive tenders alongside other organisations to be awarded contracts to deliver their own direct services. CCT was introduced through the Local Government Planning and Land Act (1980) and the Local Government Acts (1988 and 1992) in order to avoid anti-competitive behaviour by requiring local authorities to subject more of their services to competitive tendering. By the 1990s, the introduction of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) had made further inroads into the marketisation of public services (Foley, 2002) . This kind of public sector 'modernisation' has continued since the New Labour government came to power in 1997, with the emphasis now being placed upon criteria such as 'Best Value', the performance framework for regulating local government and health services.
Local government continues to be responsible for a wide range of functions including town planning, transport and communications, consumer protection and environmental health, and some housing. However, transformations in local authority provision due to the decentralisation and outsourcing of services have meant less direct involvement than was the case previously in some of these functions, most notably in education and social care. The private sector has been especially important to New Labour's welfare strategies as it has sought to increase innovation and decrease costs. At the heart of this strategy has been the development of public-private partnerships, which aim to inject new sources of capital into the welfare infrastructure and to counter the perception or reality that the public sector is performing poorly (IPPR, 2001; . However, as Farnsworth (2006a) has argued, the embedding of a more corporate orientation into social policy has had mixed results in terms of service quality. There have also been concerns regarding service agreements, a two-tier employment system, accountability, and value for money for end users. Indeed, it remains a contested issue as to whether outsourced public services perform better or worse that those delivered in-house (CBI, 2005; Farnsworth, 2006b) . For example, it has been argued that the controversial outsourcing of the functions of Local Education Authorities (LEAs) has 'failed' (Farnsworth, 2006b ).
This process of outsourcing thus involves multiple agencies and stakeholders in both the procurement and delivery of public services previously the preserve of local authorities.
Through the ethos of 'Best Value' and competitive tendering policy makers have sought to rationalise services so as to improve efficiency and provide more customer and marketoriented delivery mechanisms than the in-house practices of 'bureaucratic' local authorities.
However, these reforms have been accompanied by the increased complexity inherent in a model of cross-sector partnership working which provides challenges not just in practical terms but also in terms of the coherence of service identity and delivery (Clarke and Glendinning, 2002 
THE ROLE OF THE SOCIAL ECONOMY IN PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY
The social economy is made up of organisations that are neither public nor privately owned. responsibility (Clarke, 1993) . There has been debate in the literature over the extent to which there has been a shift in focus from the 'new localism' originating in the 1980s, and the emphasis upon regenerating individual towns and cities, towards a 'new regionalism' whereby the region is considered the preferred geographical scale to achieve economic improvement (Deas and Ward, 2000) . Whether or not this shift has been a decisive one,
however, is open to question. Nevertheless, this altered emphasis has effected structural changes which impact the sector. This can be reflected by, for instance, the introduction of regional administrative bodies such as Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) which facilitate economic development on a regional basis and which support social economy organisations as part of their remit and responsibility for allocating public grant funding.
The opening up of public procurement has created attractive revenue-generating opportunities for non-statutory organisations, including those in the social economy, to compete for service delivery contracts. At the same time, social economy organisations are increasingly being encouraged to engage in regional networks and cross-sector partnerships in an effort to build their capabilities and re-position themselves as 'mainstream' actors (Kendall, 2000) . Indeed, the government has shown particular interest in those social economy organisations which are regarded as more market-driven and which have the capacity to be financially self-sustaining, and has relabelled such organisations as 'social enterprises'. In doing so the government has sought to argue that social economy organisations which sustain themselves through delivering public services are in fact businesses. This is reflected in the government's choice '…the Government believes there is significant potential for more public services to be delivered by social enterprises, and that local authorities in particular have an important role in opening up procurement processes' (DTI, 2002a: 8 The next section examines the implications of the widening role of social economy organisations into the delivery of public services and the potential problems or challenges of such involvement. This is centred upon the two core issues of community engagement and accountability.
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE: COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY
As noted above, social economy organisations have been encouraged to compete for procurement contracts to deliver public services (H M Treasury, 2002) capacity building on the ground, which may be beyond the capabilities of local authorities (Turner and Martin, 2005) . Thus in addition to delivering public services, they may have the potential to simultaneously support local regeneration and build social cohesion (Amin et al., 1999) . However, at least two problems associated with using social economy organisations to deliver public services can be identified, and which are explored below. Firstly, the extent to which social economy organisations are able to achieve genuine community engagement is critiqued in terms of the limitations they face in achieving community-based participatory democracy on a local level, when this is attempted in their capacities primarily as delivery agents to local authorities. Secondly, consideration is given to the potential challenges facing social economy which seek to ensure stakeholder involvement and stakeholder accountability through their governance structures.
Whilst the policy context varies in different English regions as well as under the devolved governments of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, there has been a UK wide mobilisation of local public sector modernisation, decentralisation and regional development.
Different localities have different politics, socio-economic structures, and demography, which influence the level of individual participation by social economy organisations.
Nevertheless, it has been the case in these regions that key innovations involving social economy organisations have been evident, and there has been a parallel increase in horizontal contact between local government, the third sector and other groups to form territorial policy communities in areas such as economic development, social exclusion and rural policy (Keating, 2005) . For instance, an active concern with the integration of community Therefore, the promotion of local participation across the UK's regions by New Labour was part of a process of democratic renewal, which is itself difficult to separate from increases in active citizenship and greater community engagement in local issues. However, there are challenges facing many social economy organisations in terms of fostering individual participation and community engagement. For instance, it is well documented that deprived areas tend to have lower levels of individual participation in civil society and engagement with formal bodies than those living in more affluent areas (Williams, 2005) . In deprived areas, most community engagement occurs on a one-to-one basis rather than with formal groups. These areas are of primary interest to the social economy because of their relative deprivation, therefore non-participation is problematic as it contradicts the core purpose of the sector, which is that it exists for and is representative of, the needs of the local community. This may be resolved in part by resisting simplistic constructs of 'community' based solely upon geographic criteria, and embracing the specific needs of community groups diverse sectors of the community may be beyond the scope or capacity of many smaller social economy organisations. Also, whilst it may be the case that the social economy is better placed to deal with issues of engagement and participation due to its embedded nature, the integration and declaration of these concerns into the fabric of contractual partnerships entered into with the large bureaucracies of local authorities as part of their social outcomes may belie the purported aims of adopting a more bottom-up approach of co-governance between the community and local government. As the social economy organisation increasingly performs the role of service agent, this shift in emphasis may inhibit its degree of autonomy and power at the local level in the arenas of community campaigning or advocacy.
Once a contract has been awarded, the responsibility for delivering services on behalf of the local authority rests with the delivering agent. Accountability for delivery is institutionalised by the governance structures, which are in turn dependent on the active participation of local people in the establishment and management of the organisation. Therefore, community engagement and local participation are inherently bound up with issues of governance and accountability. The service delivery agent is responsible for ensuring transparency in its adherence to procedures for reporting performance to the awarding body. In the case of a social economy organisation, this must also be achieved and balanced with the interests of community stakeholders.
The extent to which social economy organisations are accountable to the wider public sector in the provision of public services is thus of significant importance, particularly as their are to revitalise local democracy (Bucek and Smith, 2000) , social economy organisations clearly need to be accountable to local stakeholders. This implies that mechanisms which allow two-way exchanges with all of the key stakeholders will need to be enshrined in the structure and managerial processes of the organisation. This may prove challenging, particularly for the smaller, traditionally grant-dependant social economy organisation, which could suffer an erosion of autonomy in their capacity as ancillary service agents (Osborne and McLaughlin, 2004) , resulting in a reduction in power in community policy-driven governance particularly where community views or preferences may not coincide with those of local government.
The related areas of community engagement and accountability associated with the subcontracting of public services thus pose specific challenges to the social economy. In the following section, the potential of a relatively new organisational form -the Development Trust -is considered in terms of its ability to reconcile or overcome these problems.
Challenges facing the Development Trust model are also considered. Development Trusts are adopting an increasingly prominent role in local economic development in general and public service delivery in particular, and offer potential 'solutions' to the issues outlined above. with their communities to define local needs and to design solutions to those needs.
DEVELOPMENT TRUSTS AND PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY
Accountability to community stakeholders is sought through local representation on governing bodies. Each Trust has a strong geographical identity yet deals with multiple communities of interest. They have been established in a range of locations -inner cities, market and coastal regions, post-industrial towns, and rural communities -although as shown in Table 1 they are clustered in the areas that score highly on the Index of Deprivation (DTA,
2005; ODPM, 2004).
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More specifically, Development Trusts seek to achieve their regeneration objectives through the provision of a range of community-centred services such as property development and building restoration, managed workspace, employment support and training, arts, sports and leisure facilities, retail and market space, recycling services, and community transport. Thus, Development Trusts are engaged in a diverse range of activities. For example, Goodwin Development Trust, located in Hull, generates an annual turnover of several million pounds.
It is managed by a board of trustees who are drawn from the large, inner-city housing estate where it is located. It is involved in the provision of a wide range of services, and tenders for contracts to deliver public services. It is engaged in delivering education, training, childcare, social care and public transportation services locally. Similarly, Hastings Development Trust serves a predominantly rural hinterland and is managed by a board of trustees drawn from local people. It also delivers a range of services formerly the responsibility of the local authority, including social care and childcare. Also, Inverclyde Community Development services including community care and befriending services, employment training, childcare support and regeneration services for both business and social economy start-ups.
As independent organisations, Development Trusts attempt to be self-sustaining by acquiring assets to enable growth and income-generating streams to support other social functions.
They are also often engaged in trading operations or contract income. All financial surpluses generated enable greater operational autonomy and are applied to the social objectives of the organisation and the community projects it runs/supports. The quality of services delivered is This is a position of unique strength, but also means that for a development trust to realise its potential it must build active alliances with all these sectors. An organisation which works in an isolated, exclusive or sectarian way is not a development trust ' (DTA, 2005) .
activities are precluded from adopting the status of Development Trust. Although this may involve same sector partnerships with other social economy organisations, there is an expectation that local regeneration initiatives are best achieved through coordinated crosssector partnership working.
The partnership approach upon which Development Trusts are based is useful in encouraging sustainability and multi-party stakeholder concerns. However, although such an approach can benefit marginalised communities, the by-product of this strategy is that it promotes a form of community-based regeneration that is based on a distinctly neo-corporatist ethic. Although the partnership model has the potential to help community-based organisations access revenue streams and resources, it can also adversely affect their capacity to engender meaningful change amongst communities because of the constraints that it imposes upon organisational autonomy. These arguments are put forward in relation to the social economy more broadly by Osborne and McLaughlin (2004) , who suggest that community organisations which assume the role of ancillary service agents effectively reduce their real power and influence with respect to community governance and power at the local level in the arenas of community campaigning and advocacy. The Development Trust has the potential to overcome these problems due to its highly developed governance structures which are determined by the community they serve through their constitutional arrangements, often with community members or groups represented on governing boards. The fact that Development Trusts tend to be based upon the principle of asset-led growth and development means that they are not only likely to be more sustainable, but are also not exclusively reliant upon local authority income, thus enabling greater autonomy. Such a feature is of course highly prized in a sector which prides itself on its ability to lobby government and other groups and has the power to be adversarial where this is seen to be warranted and in the best interests of the local community. Also, attempts towards greater cohesiveness via industry bodies such as the DTA has the potential to provide collective representation of interests and advocacy on a national level.
There is also the issue of how Development Trusts are held accountable to their communities.
The social responsibility of Development Trusts lies in providing for the interests of their communities, and therefore they must generate the maximum revenue from trading activities to reinvest in community projects. Such an approach is based on the principal assumption that 'community' exists in a coherent form that has the power to demand accountability. The to become the Trust's offices (Grewal, 2005) . The Queensbridge Trust, based in East
London, was held up as a model of neighbourhood-led regeneration by the UK government.
However, the Trust collapsed after Hackney Council withdrew from an agreement to let the Queensbridge Trust run local leisure facilities (Loney, 2005) . A recent study carried out on behalf of the DTA highlighted the challenges facing Trusts that engage in public service delivery (Garlick, 2005) . Whilst 92% of Trusts were paid by local authorities to provide public services, representing the largest single source of income for 40% of Trusts, just 16%
of Trusts responded that they made a surplus from these activities. Furthermore, the financial structuring of Trusts, whereby profits must be reinvested into projects, prevents the creation or maintenance of a financial surplus that might protect against cash flow difficulties. These might occur in relation to contract fulfilment, renewal and termination. In the same survey, more than 90% of Trusts reported that they did not receive adequate notice about the termination of contracts, and more than 80% stated that local authorities failed to pay on time.
The survey describes a situation where local authorities view Development Trusts as a means to achieve flexibility in contracting out services, but without necessarily paying the private sector premium associated with devolved service delivery. This is not surprising given the focus on cost control in service delivery, and the lack of an effective mechanism through which to attach a financial value to community based services offered by organisations in the social economy. Although the government actively encourages the social economy to become more involved in delivering public services through schemes such as Futurebuilders, the difficulties reported by Garlick (2005) inhibit their ability to do so whilst maintaining selfsufficiency. The divergence between government approaches and external policy pressures upon the awarding of public sector contracts is exemplified by the NHS's purchasing policies that appear to be favourable towards Development Trusts. However, in reality these are constrained by the overriding pressure for 'Best Value' and the need to comply with European laws on awarding contracts that govern the procurement of goods and services over a threshold value.
Therefore, it is clear that Development Trusts may indeed suffer from some of the same challenges likely to befall others in the social economy. However, the Development Trust model facilitates independence through characteristics such as asset-led growth and the development of trading operations which can enable the organisation to avoid over-reliance on a single funder and reduce dependence on grant-aid in the long term. This strategy of aiming towards self-sufficiency and 'cultivating enterprise' (DTA, 2005) of course aligns with dominant Third Way politics, and is therefore likely to engender support for the sector.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
As an integral part of a Third Way between the market and the state, the social economy has emerged as an important force in the UK economy. The devolvement of the delivery of public services from local authorities to organisations that provide 'Best Value' has created opportunities for social economy organisations to compete for, and secure, revenuegenerating contracts which, alongside other income generating activities, will enable them to achieve financial sustainability. Although a contract between the local authority and the agent will specify the terms and requirements of the services to be delivered, deep local knowledge about which services are required at local level will be difficult unless the agent is embedded in the community it aims to serve. It is in this capacity that the potential contribution of Development Trusts to social and economic regeneration is apparent. Development Trusts can draw on their knowledge of community interests, strong local connectivity, and local governance structures and combine this with their membership of a national movement with shared values, commitments and responsibilities. Part of their remit has evolved into adopting increased prominence in local activities that were once the preserve of local authorities.
However, challenges are faced when these organisations are encouraged, or obliged through economic necessity, to tender competitively for local authority contracts as service delivery agents.
Whilst the challenges facing communities and governing neighbourhoods require small-scale focused localism, in the context of public sector 'modernisation', the trend may actually be in the opposite direction (Robertson, 2005) . Perhaps as Amin et al (2000: 20) argue, 'regional' social economies may be simply heterogeneous agglomerations of localised practices'. Police forces are being encouraged to merge into supra-regional bodies, local doctors' surgeries are amalgamating into Primary Care Trusts, and other local services are becoming less local in their management and operation. Correspondingly, the most successful Development Trusts in practice are either highly localised, and effectively non-commercial in nature, or able to operate on a supra-regional level providing expertise above and beyond that of a local service provider such as the local authority. Thus, whilst Development Trusts may enhance and give emphasis to local democracy by concurring with a decentralisation agenda of local autonomy and community participation, they need to consider closely the extent to which the provision of public services meets their social and community regeneration goals.
Consequently, the implications identified in this paper of the current shift in emphasis towards the provision of public services by social economy organisations such as Development Trusts are threefold. First, although social economy involvement in service provision has the potential to improve community engagement and build social capital, challenges will be faced in ensuring adequate and appropriate levels of community engagement. Some individuals and communities are more actively engaged than others. This might be resolved by training and the use of community-based governance structures to ensure all individuals are represented in consultation processes, especially those from minority interest groups who might be excluded. Second, active community engagement provides a mechanism for ensuring local accountability. However, to maintain fairness, processes to facilitate consistent and comparable levels of accountability between communities will be required. Regional and individual variations will mean that some communities are likely to be more experienced at ensuring accountability is maintained.
Within the emerging framework of the increasingly devolved responsibility for public services being passed to multiple agents, the autonomy of social economy organisations is arguably limited by the increasing trend towards giving them a more dominant role as ancillary service agents. The implication is a reduction in their overt power in community and policy governance. Third, at organisational level, the pressure to generate revenue from contracts to deliver public services may mean that organisations in the social economy may sacrifice their regeneration activities -their core purpose and community-embedded function -to become associated increasingly with public service delivery. This has major strategic Businesses' as part of the promotion of government procurement from small private sector businesses (SMEs).
5 In addition to the Development Trusts operating in the English regions as outlined in Table   1 , the Development Trusts Association (DTA) regional network is formally coordinated via separate organisational arms comprising the Development Trusts Association (England), the Development Trusts Association Scotland, and the Development Trusts Association Wales.
Members of each DTA body automatically receive membership and representation of the UK-wide association. Social enterprises will have the opportunity to register as CICs, however this would necessarily involve a surrender of their charitable status (where this is held). This would mean that they would function under a legal 'lock' ensuring assets and profits from trading are used for the
